B.11.
Atty. Gran for Governor of the Province of Pampanga, while his close friend, Atty. M, ran for Mayor of the Municipality of Guagua, Pampanga. They both won convincingly. Eventually, the losing candidates timely filed election protests. The losing gubernatorial candidate, Mr. A, filed his protest before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga (RTC), whereas the losing mayoralty candidate, Mr. B, filed his protest before the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (MTC).
(a) What are the term limits for the positions of Atty. G and Atty. M? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The term limits for both are three terms of three years for each term (Section 43(a), Local Government Code).
(b) Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case filed by Mr. A? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by Mr. A. COMELEC has jurisdiction over an election contest between a losing gubernatorial candidate and a proclaimed winner of the gubernatorial post (Article IX-C, Section 2(2), 1987 Constitution).
(c) Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the case filed by Mr. B? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The MTC does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by Mr. B. The RTC has jurisdiction over an election contest between a losing municipal mayoralty candidate and a proclaimed municipal mayor (Article IX-C, Section 2(2), 1987 Constitution).
B.12
W, the incumbent Congressman of the Province of Albay, decided to run for Governor. He filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for Governor without resigning from his post and continued exercising his duties as Congressman, such as attending plenary sessions and committee hearings in the House of Representatives. One of W’s fiercest critics, X, claimed that W should not be dispensing the functions of a Congressman since he is deemed ipso facto resigned as such upon his filing of a CoC for Governor of Albay.
(a) Is X’s argument correct? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument of X is not correct. Section 14 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Act) reads: “Sec. 14. Repealing Clause. – Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed.” Section 67 of BP 881, which deemed elective officials ipso facto resigned when they file their Certificate of Candidacy, is inoperative, and therefore W may still continue office.
(b) Assuming that W is instead, an incumbent Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense, what is the effect of the filing of his CoC for the position of Governor of Albay to said post? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
W would be considered ipso facto resigned. Under Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), “any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” W, as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense, is an appointive official, and provision is an appointive official, and therefore falls under this provision.
B.13.
Who are the impeachable officers under the 1987 Constitution? Briefly explain the process of impeaching them thereunder. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the following are impeachable officers: The President, the Vice- President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
The process of impeachment is provided for in Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. It states the following:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
B.14.
A proposal to change a provision of the 1987 Constitution has been put forth as follows:
Original Text: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Proposed Text: “The Philippines is a democratic and socialist State. Sovereignty resides in the party and all government authority emanates from it.”
(a) Is this an amendment or a revision? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The proposal is a revision. Using the qualitative test provided in the case of Lambino v. COMELEC, the main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” In this case, the proposal to change where the sovereignty resides – from the people to the party – definitely alters the nature of the Philippine government, thus satisfying the test [Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006].
(b) Briefly explain the process to revise the 1987 Constitution. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Any revision of the Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members;
or
2. A constitutional convention.
The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
The revision shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision (Article XVII, Sections.1, 3 & 4, 1987 Constitution).
B.15.
R was elected as Municipal Councilor for three (3) consecutive terms. Before the end of the third term, Vice Mayor S died, rendering his post vacant. Since R was the highest-ranking Municipal Councilor, he assumed the office of the Vice Mayor. One of his constituents, T, assailed R’s assumption of office, arguing that elections should have been conducted to fill in the vacancy following the death of Vice Mayor S.
(a) Is T’s contention correct? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, T’s contention is not correct. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor [Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008].
(b) Assuming that R validly assumed S’s post, at the end of R’s term as Vice Mayor, may he run, once more, for the position of Municipal Councilor? Or is he proscribed to do so under the Local Government Code? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
R can still run for the position of Municipal Councilor. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service [Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008].
B.16.
Under the 1987 Constitution, to whom does each duty/power/ privilege/prohibition/disqualification apply:
(a) The authority to keep the general accounts of the Government and for such period provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting documents pertaining thereto. (1%)
(b) The power to allow small-scale utilization of natural resources bby Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. (1%)
(c) The authority to provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees. (1%)
(d) The sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (1%)
(e) The power to ratify treaties and international agreements. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The Commission on Audit (Article IX-D, Section 2(1),1987 Constitution).
(b) The Congress, by virtue of a special law (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 3, 1987 Constitution).
(c) The Civil Service Commission (Article IX-B, Section 5, 1987 Constitution).
(d) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately (Article VI, Section 23(1), 1987 Constitution).
(e) The President [Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000].
Alternative Answer:
(e) The Senate [Article VII, Section 21, 1987 Constitution; based on jurisprudence, Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016; Pimentel Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005].
B.17.
In 2014, Congress enacted an appropriation law containing a provision that gives individual legislators the discretion to determine, post-enactment, how much funds would go to a specific project or beneficiary which they themselves also determine. Consequently, disbursements were made in the interim pursuant thereto.
Eventually, Mr. Z filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of the statutory provision on the ground that it violates the separation of powers principle. On the other hand, certain Congressmen argued that there was nothing wrong with the provision because, after all, the power to appropriate belongs to Congress.
(a) Rule on the arguments of the parties. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will rule in favor of Mr. Z. The provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the separation of powers.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the General Appropriations Act, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government.
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation out and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws” pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution [Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013].
(b) Assuming that the provision is declared unconstitutional, should the disbursements made pursuant thereto be returned, in light of the doctrine of operative fact? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the disbursements need not be returned, as the doctrine of operative fact applies.
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
In the case of Araullo v. Aquino [G.R. No. 29287, July 1, 2014], the Court found the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the Disbursement Acceleration Program. “Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.”
B.18.
A was appointed by the President as a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) while Congress was not in session. Pending confirmation of his appointment by the Commission on Appointments, A started to perform his official functions in the COMELEC, such as attending en banc sessions, hearing election protests, signing Resolutions, issuing Orders, and appearing before Congress during budget hearings. Atty. B questioned before the Supreme Court the exercise of official functions by A, stating that his ad interim appointment is not a permanent appointment but a temporary one pending confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and thus, prohibited under Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which states that “[i]n no case shall any Member [of the COMELEC] be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
(a) Is Atty. B’s contention correct? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, B’s contention is not correct. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].
(b) If the Commission on Appointments bypassed the confirmation of A, can he still be reappointed by the President? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the President can continue to reappoint A. Under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a bypassed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. The prohibition on reappointment in Article IX-C, Section 1 (2) of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor bypassed ad interim appointments. A bypassed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Article VII, Section 16 of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.
B.19.
Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a close electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500 votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), claiming that X should be disqualified to run for said position because he is not a natural-born citizen. While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected Congressman of the province.
(a) Distinguish between natural-born and naturalized citizens under the 1987 Constitution. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Article IV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution)
So On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who acquire Philippine citizenship through either: 1) judicial naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) or 2) administrative naturalization under the Administrative Naturalization Law (Republic Act 9139). A third option is derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands found under Section 15 of CA 473 which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Section 15 also provides for derivative naturalization for the children.
(b) Is X qualified to run for Congress? Explain. (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, X is not qualified to run for Congress. The Constitution prescribes that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Article VI, Section 6, 1987 Constitution). In this case, X is a naturalized citizen and is thus not qualified to run for Congress.
(c) Did X’s proclamation divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction. to decide the case and vest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to hear the case? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, COMELEC maintains its jurisdiction over the matter. To divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction over election cases of Members of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must concur:
1. Valid proclamation;
2. Valid oath; and
3. Assumption of office on June 30.
Thus, the mere proclamation of X does not yet transfer jurisdiction from the COMELEC to the HRET [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013].
B.20.
H, a naturalized American citizen who later became a dual citizen under Republic Act No. 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act), decided to run for Congress and thus, filed a certificate of candidacy (CoC). A citizen argued that H is ineligible for the position because of his status as a dual citizen. H responded that his act of filing a CoC amounted to his renunciation of foreign citizenship, rendering him eligible for the position.
(a) Was H’s filing of a CoC sufficient to renounce foreign citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, H’s filing of a CoC is not sufficient to renounce foreign citizenship. Section 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act) requires that “Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.”
(b) Assuming that H is a dual citizen because his parents are Filipino citizens and he was born in California, USA, was his filing of a CoC sufficient to renounce his foreign citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the filing of his CoC was not sufficient to renounce his foreign citizenship. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural- born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not [Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012].
END OF PART II
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