PART I
A.1.
In January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6th) month of pregnancy, was crossing a street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven by Mr. X. As a result, Mrs. A sustained serious injuries and further, suffered an unintentional abortion. Mrs. A was hospitalized for two (2) months, during which she incurred P400,000.00 in medical fees. Her expenses were all duly substantiated by official receipts. During the two (2)-month period of her confinement, she was unable to report for work and earn any salary, which was established at the rate of P50,000.00 per month. Mrs. A then filed a civil case for damages against Mr. X.
(a) Based on the case filed by Mrs. A, what is the source of Mr. X’s obligation to her as a result of his acts? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mr. X’s obligation arose from a quasi-delict, one of the five sources of obligations (Article 1157[5], Civil Code). The Code also provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done and such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict (Article 2176, Civil Code). Here, Mr. X, in recklessly driving a car, hit Mrs. A, thereby causing serious injuries and unintentional abortion to the latter.
(b) May Mrs. A claim actual damages from Mr. X? If so, how much can Mrs. A claim? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim actual damages amounting to P500,000. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to actual or compensatory damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The medical fees totaling P400,000 were duly substantiated by official receipts. Article 2200 of the Civil Code also provides that indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. The rate of her salary was established at P50,000 per month; thus, her inability to report for work and to earn salary for two months entitled her to a total of P100,000. Mrs. A, therefore, can claim her expenses for medical fees and two months’ worth of salary, the total of which is P500,000.
(c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Birth determines personality. The Court has held that an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, and if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs [Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R..No. L-16439, July 20, 1961].
Alternative Answer:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Under Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the State is obliged to protect equally the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. This provision should be applied in favor of the unborn child, and therefore modifies the Geluz v. Court of Appeals ruling.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. The Court has held that a conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code, which includes being a recipient of donations under Article 742 of the Civil Code, as well as support. A claim for damages in favor of the unborn child should also prosper [Quimiguing v. Icao, G.R. No. 26795, July 31, 1970].
(d) What must Mrs. A prove if she wants to recover moral damages from Mr. X? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mrs. A must prove that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. (Article 2217, Civil Code) She must also prove that Mr. X’s reckless driving produced the physical injury in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced injury, without which she would not have suffered the same, that is, the reckless driving is the proximate cause of the injury. Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries (Article 2219[2], Civil Code).
Alternative Answer:
Mrs. A must prove the following: (1) that she suffered physical injuries; (2) that Mr. X committed a culpable act or omission; (3) that the wrongful act or omission of Mr. X is the proximate cause of the damages she sustained; and (4) that X’s act or omission is either a criminal offense resulting to physical injuries or a quasi-delict causing physical injuries [Mendoza v. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014].
(e) Assuming that Mrs. A is awarded actual and moral damages by the trial court, may she also claim interest if the final and executory judgment award remains unpaid by Mr. X? If so, when should the interest be reckoned and what is the rate of interest? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mrs. A may also claim interest. The interest, should be 6% per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction. The Court held in Nacar v. Gallery Frames [G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013], interpreting Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas MB Circular No. 799, that when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be the equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
A.2.
Hand W were married in 1990. H, being a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not heard from her husband, H
One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since 1995. In consequence, W diligently pursued all available means to ascertain her husband’s whereabouts, but to no avail.
Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP in 2008 for the death benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the AFP, despite being cognizant of H’s status, would not act on the claim, contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a judicial declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.
In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary? In this case, is the contention of the AFP correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary only for the purpose of contracting a subsèquent marriage. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage contracted by a person who had a well- founded belief that his or her prior spouse who had been absent for four consecutive years was already dead, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The contention of the AFP is incorrect. The Court has declared that the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier and the claimant need only present any “evidence” which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the a person Civil Code. Article 391(2) of the Civil Code provides that a in the armed forces who has taken part in war and has been missing for four years shall be presumed dead for all purposes. Here, W informed the AFP that her husband had been declared missing since 1995, 23 years before the filing of her claim in 2018. There is, thus,
no need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death before the AFP can act on the claim of W [Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018].
A.3.
Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz’s illicit relationship, a child named C was born. In C’s birth certificate, “Cruz” appears as the child’s surname, although Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged C as his child.
In 2018, Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition in court for parental custody and change or correction of C’s surname in the child’s birth certificate from “Cruz” to “Reyes.” At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.
(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. Reyes should not be granted custody because C is an illegitimate child, who shall be under the parental authority of his mother (Article 176, Family Code). lste forven revalen
The Family Code provides that children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate (Article 165). In this case, C was conceived and born out of the illicit relationship of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz who are not married; thus, C is an illegitimate child of Mr. Reyes. The Court has held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of the child. The Court has further declared that since the law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child, it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else [Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004]. There is no showing that Ms. Cruz, C’s mother is unfit to exercise sole parental authority over C; therefore, she cannot be deprived of C’s custody.
(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of
C’s surname from “Cruz” to “Reyes”? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. Reyes cannot compel the change of surname from “Cruz” to “Reyes.” The Court has held that Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. The Court further declared that it is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children; hence, Mr. Reyes cannot validly compel the change or correction of C’s surname [Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014].
If they are still minors, however, the decision to use the father’s surname may be exercised for them by their mother pursuant to the latter’s parental authority over illegitimate children. In this case, the father cannot compel the mother to register the child under his surname.
A.4.
F, a Filipina, married J, a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3) years, they had a falling out and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan which was not opposed by J because under Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry. F’s divorce petition was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.
May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently, capacitate F to remarry here? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the legal effects of the divorce decree may be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently, capacitate F to remarry.
In the case of Republic v. Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], the Court held that under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Here, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan and obtained a favorable judgment which capacitated her Japanese husband to remarry. Applying paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code as interpreted in Republic v. Manalo, the legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines which may capacitate F to remarry here.
[Note: The legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines; however, it may not capacitate her to remarry as a matter of enforcement of said divorce. Recognition is different from enforcement, the latter being subject to defenses].
A.5.
X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a child, Z. They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020. When X’s parents found about the news, they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a gold ring valued at P250,000.00, which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child. One day, X and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage plans.
(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is a void donation. This is an ordinary donation inter vivos, not a donation propter nuptias. The Civil Code provides that if the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing; otherwise, the donation shall be void. A piece of jewelry like the family heirloom here which is a gold ring, valued at P250,000.00, is a personal property. Here, the acceptance was made orally; therefore, the donation is void (Article 748).
(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X’s parents revoke the donation on the ground that the marriage of X with Y di not push through? Explain. (3%)
who is capacitated to remarry. Here, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan and obtained a favorable judgment which capacitated her Japanese husband to remarry. Applying paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code as interpreted in Republic v. Manalo, the legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines which may capacitate F to remarry here.
[Note: The legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be recognized in the Philippines; however, it may not capacitate her to remarry as a matter of enforcement of said divorce. Recognition is different from enforcement, the latter being subject to defenses].
A.5.
X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a child, Z. They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020. When X’s parents found about the news, they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a gold ring valued at P250,000.00, which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child. One day, X and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage plans.
(a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is a void donation. This is an ordinary donation inter vivos, not a donation propter nuptias. The Civil Code provides that if the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing; otherwise, the donation shall be void. A piece of jewelry like the family heirloom here which is a gold ring, valued at P250,000.00, is a personal property. Here, the acceptance was made orally; therefore, the donation is void (Article 748).
(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X’s parents revoke the donation on the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because it is an ordinary donation, not a donation propter nuptias. The ground that the marriage did not push through may only be raised to revoke donations by reason of marriage which is defined by Article 86 of the Family Code, as those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses (Article 82, Family Code). Here, the donation was not made in favor of one or both of the future spouses, but in favor of their child. X’s parents, therefore, cannot revoke the donation on the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through.
A.6.
Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following property regimes as enumerated under the Family Code:
(a) Absolute community of property (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[Any 2 of the 3 may be considered]:
1. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator, or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
3. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property (Article 92, Family Code).
(b) Conjugal partnership of gains (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[Any 2 of the 4 may be considered]:
1. Property which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
2. Property which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
3. Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
4. Property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband (Article 109, Family Code).
A.7.
Believing that he owned a certain parcel of land and completely unaware of any defect in his title thereto, Mr. A started to build a house thereon. When Mr. P, the real owner of the land learned of Mr. A’s actions, Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises. However, Mr. A refused to leave, and instead, asserted that as a builder in good faith, Mr. P is obliged to sell the land to him.
(a) Is the claim of Mr. A correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. A is not correct. ‘Mr. A who was completely unaware of any defect in his title, is a builder in good faith. Mr. P who prompted Mr. A’s possession also acted in good faith. Article 448 applies in this case, which provides that only the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, has the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity for necessary expenses and useful expenses where applicable, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. The law grants said rights to the owner of the land. The builder in good faith, Mr. A in this case, cannot compel Mr. P, the owner of the land, to choose which right to exercise, for the option belongs to the owner alone.
Alternative Answer:
No, Mr. A is incorrect. He is a builder in bad faith. When Mr. A started building his house, he was completely unaware of any defect in his title and therefore, was, at the outset, a builder in good faith but when Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises before he completed the house, which Mr. A refused to do and he continued building since he persisted in the belief that his title had no fatal defect, he became a builder in bad faith. Mr. P, the real owner, who immediately asked him to leave the premises, acted in good faith. He has by law the option of acquiring the house without paying for it (Article 449, Civil Code).
(b) Assuming that Mr. P all the while, knew but did not object to Mr. A’s construction of the house on his property, may Mr. A compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr. P’s bad faith? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mr. A may compel Mr. P to purchase the improvements. Article 454 of the Civil Code provides that when the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the provisions of Article 447 shall apply. Article 453 of the same Code provides that it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. Article 447 provides that the owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. The landowner, having known and without opposing the construction made by Mr. A is deemed to have acted in bad faith; Article 447, therefore, applies and Mr. P shall pay the value of the improvement, i.e. the value of the materials, plus damages.
Alternative Answer:
Since Mr. A is a builder in bad faith for continuing to build despite being asked to leave the premises, and Mr. P also acted in bad faith for not objecting to Mr. A’s construction of his house on his property, they shall be treated to have both acted in good faith (Article 453, Civil Code). The bad faith of Mr. A is neutralized by the bad faith of Mr. P; thus, Article 448 of the Civil Code shall apply. The two options still belong to Mr. P, not Mr. A.
A.8.
Mr. E leased a piece of land from Mr. F to be used for his sawmill business for a period of ten (10) years. Consequently, Mr. E placed heavy machineries thereon to be used for his aforementioned business, with the intention of removing them after the expiration of the lease period.
Are Mr. E’s heavy machineries considered real properties under the Civil Code? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, they are movables. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner thereof in a land or building which is also owned by him, for an industry or works which may be carried on in a tenement and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or works, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner, for instance, if the lease contained a stipulation that any useful improvement which the lessee introduces on the leased property shall pertain to the lessor at the termination of the lease. Here, the heavy machineries were placed by Mr. E on a piece of land leased from Mr. F with the intention of removing them after the expiration of the lease period. Being movable in nature, said machineries were not deemed immobilized [Davao Saw Mill Co. Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 40411, August 7, 1935].
A.9.
Ms. U is a usufructuary of a piece of land owned by Mr. L. During the existence of the usufruct, Ms. U introduced various useful improvements on the land. Upon termination of the usufruct, Mr. L requested Ms. U to remove the said improvements, but Ms. U refused, demanding instead that Mr. L reimburse her the value of the same.
(a) What is a usufruct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides (Article 562, Civil Code).
The Court has further declared that a usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, (plus, impliedly, the jus possidendi) with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same [Moralidad v. Sps. Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006].
(b) Is Ms. U’s demand proper? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the demand is not proper. The Civil Code provides that the usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct any useful improvements, or expenses for mere pleasure, which he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property (Article 579, Civil Code).
Ms. U, thus, has no right to be indemnified for any improvements which she might have made on the land held in usufruct. She may only remove them should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.
A.10.
Village H and Village L are adjoining residential villages in a mountainous portion of Antipolo City, Rizal, with Village L being lower in elevation than Village H. In an effort to beautify Village H, its developer, X, Inc., constructed a clubhouse which included an Olympic-sized swimming pool and an artificial lagoon on a portion of land overlooking Village L.
During the monsoon season, the continuous heavy rains caused Village H’s swimming pool and artificial lagoon to overflow, resulting into a massive spillover that damaged various properties in Village L. Aggrieved, the homeowners of Village L filed a complaint for damages against X, Inc. In defense, X, Inc. contended that pursuant to the Civil Code, Village L, as the lower estate, was obliged to receive the waters descending from Village H, the higher estate. Hence, it cannot be held liable for damages.
Is X, Inc.’s position tenable? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, X, Inc.’s position is not tenable. The Water Code provides that lower estates are only obliged to receive waters which naturally and without intervention of man flow from higher estates (Article 50, Water Code of the Philippines). The Code also provides that the owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the natural flow. Therefore, Village L, as the lower estate, was only obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from higher estates and not those which are due to the massive spillover from constructions made by X, Inc. (Article 637 of the Civil Code).
X, Inc., therefore, is liable for damages.
END OF PART 1