FACTS:

Petitioner Diosdado Sama y Hinupas, et al. were charged for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, for allegedly conspiring in cutting a Dita tree with the use of unregistered power chainsaw.

On arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty.

On the part of the defense, witness Barangay Captain Aceveda testified that on March 15, 2005, he was resting at home when he noticed several police officers and DENR employees passing by. When he inquired, they told him they were on their way to Barangay Laylay in San Teodoro for surveillance on illegal loggers.

After a few hours, the team returned and brought with them the accused who are members of the Iraya-Mangyan indigenous peoples (IPs). The police officers told him they caught the accused cutting down a dita tree. He then asked the accused if the allegations against them were true. They told him they cut the tree for the construction of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs’ community toilet. He was aware of this construction and confirmed that the Dita tree was planted within the ancestral domain of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs.

The defense did not present any documentary evidence.

The trial court convicted the accused, as charged.

The trial court ruled that a dita tree with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet can be classified as “timber” within the purview of Section 68, now Section 7718 of PD 705, as amended. Thus, cutting the dita tree without a corresponding permit from the DENR or any competent authority violated the law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Petitioners now seek affirmative relief from the Court, reiterating their plea for acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether there evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of violation of Section 77 of PD 705, as amended.

RULING:

We acquit.

Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt:

SECTION 2. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. — In a criminal case, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

In practice, there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt where the judge can conclude: “All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the crime as prescribed in the law.”

The prosecution was not able to prove the guilt of petitioners for

violation of Section 77, PD 705, as amended, beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 77 of PD 705, as amended, punishes, among others, “Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority…”

This provision has evolved

As outlined, Section 77 requires prior authority for any of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing timber or other forest products even from those lands possessed by IPs falling within the ambit of the statute’s definition of private lands.

Therefore, the language of Section 77 incriminates petitioners as they cut, gathered, collected, and removed timber from a dita tree from the land which they have called their own since time immemorial, which could either be a forest land, or an alienable or disposable public land, or a private land, as defined under PD 705, as amended, without the requisite authority pursuant to PD 705 ‘s licensing regime.

Justice Caguioa firmly opines, however, that ancestral domains and lands are outside the ambit of Section 77 as these are neither forest land, alienable or disposable public land, nor private land.

There is, however, reasonable doubt that the dita tree was cut and collected without any authority granted by the State.

It is a general principle in law that in malum prohibitum case, good faith or motive is not a defense because the law punishes the prohibited act itself. The penal clause of Section 77 of PD 705, as amended, punishes the cutting, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products only when any of these acts is done without lawful authority from the State.

The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. “An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.”

In contrast, crimes mala in se concern inherently immoral acts:

“Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea.” Mens rea is defined as “the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]”

Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent.

The malum prohibitum nature of an offense, however, does not automatically result in a conviction. The prosecution must still establish that the accused had intent to perpetrate the act.

Intent to perpetrate has been associated with the actor’s volition, or intent to commit the act. Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. In previous cases, this Court has determined the accused’s volition on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.

[I]t is clear that to determine the presence of an accused’s intent to perpetrate a prohibited act, courts may look into the meaning and scope of the prohibition beyond the literal wording of the law. Although in malum prohibitum offenses, the act itself constitutes the crime, courts must still be mindful of practical exclusions to the law’s coverage, particularly when a superficial and narrow reading of the same with result to absurd consequences.

To have a strict interpretation of the term “authority” under Sec. 77 of P.D. 705 despite the clear evolution of its text would amount to construing a penal law strictly against the accused, which cannot be countenanced. To stress, “[o]nly those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute’s operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought.”

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.