PART 1
1
Noel is the son of spouses Marie and Benedict. Benedict has passed away. For Noel’s 7th birthday, his paternal grandparents offered to organize and pay for his birthday party. In coordination with Marie, the grandparents booked the party venue, signed the. contracts with the caterer and the entertainers, finalized the guest list, and paid all amounts due. Marie promised to them to bring Noel to the party.
A week before the scheduled birthday party, Marie decided that she would not bring Noel to the party, and that she would instead take him on an out-of-town trip on the day of the party. Marie could not forget that her parents-in-law initially opposed Benedict’s marriage to her because she was a former burlesque dancer.
Marie did not notify the grandparents of her plan to skip the birthday party. During the party, the grandparents kept trying to get in touch with her but she ignored all their calls. The grandparents and the guests who went to the party were very dismayed that Noel was not present. When the grandparents asked Marie why she did not bring Noel to the party, she simply replied, “I am his mother, and I decide where he goes!” To which, Noel’s grandmother retorted, “Anak mo lang s’ya! Hindi mo s’ya pag-aari!”
The grandparents seek your advice on whether there is legal basis to hold Marie liable for the damages that they have suffered as a result of her acts.
What is your advice? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is a ground to hold Marie liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. While she is entitled to exercise her parental authority over her minor child, she nonetheless failed to exercise her right in conformity with the standards of conduct enunciated in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Long before the scheduled date of Noel’s 7th birthday celebration, Marie was already informed of the event. In fact, she participated in its preparations. There was still one full week to notify the grandparents of Noel that she decided not to bring the child to the party but she did not inform them of her plans. On the day of the celebration, she purposely ignored the grandparents’ calls. All in all, her actions showed that she deliberately and intentionally failed to bring Noel to the birthday celebration prepared by the child’s grandparents, thus violating Article 19 of the Civil Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to observe good faith in the exercise of her rights as the mother of the child caused loss and injury on the part of the grandparents, for which they must be compensated by way of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code [Navarrio-Banaria v. Banaria, G.R. No. 217806, July 28, 2020].
II
Razna and Junsi got married in 2015 and were blessed with two children, Zarah and Mica. In 2020, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the entire family had to spend 24 hours together every day in their small house. Razna observed that although Junsi continued to work from home to support the family, he began to exhibit paranoia, and constantly kept making sure that they always washed their hands and rubbed them with alcohol ten times before eating. Junsi also always wore a face mask, face shield and hazmat in the house, except when he was alone in the room. Junsi began sleeping separately from Razna and their children. He believed that other people who wanted to meet him in person were actively trying to harm him by exposing him to the virus.
In early 2022, Razna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Junsi on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing his atypical behavior. She presented the testimony of a doctor, who proved that Junsi was suffering from psychotic paranoia due to intense stress, which accounted for his belief in things that are not real.
Should Razna’s petition be granted? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it should not be granted because the totality of the evidence presented does not support a finding of psychological incapacity. According to the en banc ruling of the Supreme Court in Tan- Andal v. Andal [G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021], the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. In the given problem, the psychotic paranoia of Junsi was developed only during the COVID pandemic for fear of getting the virus. There were no juridical antecedents shown for the grant of nullity. Thus, it cannot be said that the incapacity of Junsi is caused by a durable aspect of his personality structure that was already formed even prior to the marriage.
III
Before they married in 2000, Nonoy and Daday signed a marriage settlement wherein they agreed that their property relations as husband and wife would be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. While the marriage was subsisting, they acquired a parcel of land using conjugal funds. The Register of Deeds issued a transfer certificate of title over the said land in the name of “Nonoy, married to Daday.”
Nonoy sold the parcel of land to Barby without Daday’s consent. Daday was not aware of the sale and did not sign the contract of sale. A year after Nonoy and Barby signed the contract of sale, Daday died. When the children of Nonoy and Daday learned about the sale to Barby, they questioned its validity since Daday had not consented to the sale. Nonoy’s position is that Daday’s consent was not required because the property was registered in his name.
Is the sale to Barby valid? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the sale to Barby is valid with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion owned by Nonoy, but invalid with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Daday. The property sold by Nonoy to Barby is presumed to be a conjugal property of the spouses Nonoy and Barby because the same was acquired during the marriage.
Under the law, a property acquired during the marriage in the regime of conjugal partnership of gains is presumed to be conjugal even if the same is registered in the name of one of the spouses (Article 116, Family Code). In conjugal partnership, the sale of a conjugal property by one of the spouses without the consent of the other spouse would have been invalid in its entirety. In this case, however, the sale can already be upheld as valid with respect to the undivided 1/2 pro indiviso share of the transacting spouse because the conjugal partnership was already terminated by the death of Daday and, by reason of such termination, Nonoy already acquired an undivided 1/2 pro indiviso share in the subject property which he could validly dispose of without the consent of Daday. This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest [Spouses Carlos v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 234533, June 27, 2018.]
IV
[This item has two questions.]
In 2013, Agaton, then 70 years old, executed a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to his acknowledged illegitimate son Karl. Agaton entrusted the original copy of the 2013 will to Karl. In 2014, Karl joined a group of mercenaries to fight in Crimea alongside the Russians, After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Karl did not return to the Philippines and was never heard of. Five years later, in 2019, Agaton executed a codicil which provided the following: “Because of the death of Karl, I revoke my 2013 will. I hereby recognize Gian as my other illegitimate son, and hereby bequeath to him my entire estate.” Agaton died in 2020.
During the probate of Agaton’s 2019 codicil, Karl appeared in court, presented the 2013 will, contested the validity of its revocation, opposed the probate of the 2019 codicil, and sought the probate of the 2013 will. Both the 2013 will and 2019 codicil were immaculate as to form.
(a) Did the 2019 codicil revoke the 2013 will? Explain briefly.
(b) Distribute the estate of Agaton. Explain briefly.
(5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) No, the 2013 will was not revoked by the 2019 codicil because to Article 833 of the Civil Code, the revocation of a will based on a the revocation of the 2013 will was based on a false cause, According false cause is null and void. In the given problem, the cause which induced the testator to revoke the 2013 will appear upon the face which turned out to be false. In other of the 2019 codicil itself words, the intention to revoke is conditioned upon the truth of the cause stated in the 2019 codicil which, however, turns out to be false. Therefore, there was no intention to revoke; hence, there was no revocation.
(b) The estate of Agaton is to be divided equally between Karl and Gian, who shall inherit in equal shares following the rules of intestate succession because both are heirs of the same degree. While the 2013 will is not revoked, the institution of Karl in said will, as sole to Agaton’s entire estate, is annulled because it preterited Gian, who is another compulsory heir in the direct line but totally omitted in the 2013 will. Gian is also entitled to inherit from the estate of Agaton as the latter’s illegitimate child in view of the admission of filiation made by the latter in the 2019 codicil, by the latter in the 20 which is either public instrument (if in the form of notarial will) or a private handwritten instrument (if in the form of a holographic will). In addition, the omission of Gian in the 2013 will is a case of preterition and not a case of invalid disinheritance because there was no intention to disinherit Gian, for the simple reason that he was not yet acknowledged as an illegitimate child when the said will was executed.
Joey was the legitimate son of Ron and May. Joey died intestate and was survived by his wife Kathy and their two legitimate children, Luis and Clarisse. Several months after Joey died, Ron also died intestate. Ron was survived by his wife May, daughter Mercy (full- sibling of Joey), and the children of Joey (Luis and Clarisse).
Distribute the estate of Ron. Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The estate of Ron will be divided in three equal parts, to be inherited by his daughter Mercy and widow May, who shall be inheriting in their own right, and by his grandchildren Luis and Clarisse, who shall be inheriting in representation of their father Joey. In intestate succession, the surviving spouse is entitled to a share equal to that of each of the children (Article 996, Civil Code). In addition, the rules of intestate succession also provide that should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation (Article 981, Civil Code).
VI
[This item has two questions.]
Jungkook, who owns a building, leases the same to Gel with the following terms: (i) the lease is for a period of ten years; (ii) the yearly rental is Php 1,200,000.00 payable within the first ten days of the current year; and (iii) in case of breach of any of the provisions of the lease, Gel is liable to pay Jungkook five monthly rentals. and attorney’s fees. Five years into the lease, Gel sends a notice to terminate the lease and offers to pay five monthly rentals. Despite Jungkook’s objections, Gel vacates the premises. Jungkook sues Gel for the rentals due for the remaining five years of the lease. Gel takes the position that her liability should only be limited to five monthly rentals and attorney’s fees.
(a) Is there a penalty clause in the lease agreement? Explain briefly.
(b) As between Jungkook and Gel, who is correct? Explain briefly.
(5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) Yes, the provision in the lease contract that the lessee shall be liable to pay five monthly rentals to the lessor in case of breach of any of the provisions of the lease contract is in the nature of a penalty clause. Such a clause is an accessory undertaking for the purpose of ensuring the performance of the principal obligation by imposing upon the debtor (in this case, the lessee) a special prestation consisting in the payment of a sum of money in case of breach of the obligation. In the from defaulting in the performance of his obligation; hence, is in the given problem, the foregoing clause is intended to prevent the lessee nature of a penalty clause [D.M. Ragasa Enterprises, Inc. v. Banco de Oro, Inc., G.R. No. 190512, June 20, 2018].
(b) Gel is correct in claiming that her liability to Jungkook is only limited to the payment of five monthly rentals and attorney’s fees as stipulated in the penalty clause of the contract. Gel breached the term of ten (10) years as provided for in the provisions of the lease contract when she sent a notice to terminate the lease within five (5) years when there are no stipulations that expressly allowed her to do so. Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and payment of interest in case of noncompliance with the obligation, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. But damages shall still be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. In this case, Gel is willing to pay the penalty and there was no allegation of fraud made regarding Gel’s fulfillment of the obligation. Thus, absent any stipulation to the contrary, Gel is only liable to pay the five (5) monthly rentals and attorney’s fees stipulated in the penalty clause as indemnity for damages and payment of interest for her noncompliance with the term provided for in the lease contract [PNTC Colleges, Inc. v. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021].
VII
Brenda saw the online advertisement of Evelyn, who sells limited edition sneakers. Through an exchange of text messages, Evelyn and Brenda agreed that: (i) Evelyn will sell to Brenda a pair of brand-new sneakers for Php 25,000.00; (ii) Brenda will deposit the purchase price in Evelyn’s bank account; and (iii) Evelyn will deliver the sneakers within ten days from deposit. Brenda deposited the purchase price thereof, and from Rosela to buy the same sneakers for Php 35,000.00. Evelyn Before the delivery of the sneakers, Evelyn received an offer candidly tells Brenda that she is selling the sneakers at a higher price to another buyer, and sends this text message to Brenda: “Sizt, may iba pala akong buyer na mas malaki yung offer, sorry! Balik ko nalang bayad mo, keri?” Evelyn claims that since the sneakers have not yet been delivered to Brenda, she can still withdraw the offer.
Is Evelyn’s contention tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Evelyn’s contention is not tenable. She can no longer withdraw the offer because there was already a perfected contract of sale between her and Brenda. The contract of sale is a consensual contract perfected by mere consent. In the given problem, the parties have already agreed on the subject matter, which is a pair of brand- new sneakers, on the price, and on the manner of payment. In fact, the contract was already performed on the part of the buyer Brenda when the latter already made the payment of the purchase, which payment was duly acknowledged by the seller Evelyn. Contrary to the contention of Evelyn, the delivery of the thing sold is not a requirement for the perfection of the contract because the contract of sale is not a real contract – where the contract can be perfected only upon the delivery of the object thereof. [Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111238, January 25, 1995].
VIII
In 2017, Alma orally sold a parcel of unregistered land to the spouses Ray and Shane for Php 500,000.00. Upon receipt of the initial payment of Php 350,000.00, Alma delivered possession of the land to the spouses. Shortly thereafter, Alma died. In order to formalize the sale, Ray and Shane convinced Josie, one of Alma’s children, to sign a notarized deed of confirmation of sale. In consideration thereof, Josie received Php 150,000:00 representing the balance of the purchase price. On the strength of the notarized confirmation of sale, the spouses were able to transfer the tax declaration of the property in their names. Later, Josie died.
In 2020, the surviving children of Alma discovered the oral sale of the land to Ray and Shane. They demanded the return of the property on the following grounds: (i) the oral contract of sale is void because it does not appear in a public instrument; and (ii) assuming the sale is not void, it is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Ray and Shane insisted that the sale of the land to them was both valid and enforceable.
Are the contentions of the heirs of Alma tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contentions of the heirs of Alma are not tenable because the oral sale in favor of the Spouses Ray and Shane is valid and enforceable. An oral sale of a parcel of land is valid because our existing laws do not require any formality in a contract of sale in order to make said contract valid, except in the sale of large cattle. However, the contract of sale over a real property, including lands, is covered by the Statute of Frauds which requires the contract to be in writing to be enforceable (Article 1403(2)(e), Civil Code). In this case, the defense of Statute of Frauds is not applicable because the contract is no longer purely executory. The oral sale had already been executed because the land had already been delivered to the buyer and the price was already paid to the seller. In addition, the fact that the sale is not in a public document does not affect its validity or enforceability because jurisprudence states that such requirement embodied in Article 1358 of the Civil Code is not for the purpose of validity nor for enforceability, but only for the convenience of the parties [Heirs of Alido v. Campano, G.R. No. 226065, July 29, 2019].
IX
Aida, for the consideration of Php 5,000,000.00, sold her parcel of land to Lorna, as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale. Lorna, however, failed to deliver the amount in full, paying only Php 500,000.00 as down payment. Because of the non-payment of the balance, Aida simply sold the same parcel of land to Fe with the intention of returning to Lorna the Php 500,000.00 down payment.
Who among Aida, Lorna, and Fe owns the property? Explain
briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Lorna owns the property because ownership has already been transferred to her upon the constructive delivery of the property as evidenced by the notarized Deed of Sale. The contract between Lorna and Aida had no stipulation reserving ownership property to the vendor until full payment of the consideration. Thus, Aida has already transferred her ownership over the property when she executed a notarized Deed of Sale in favor of Lorna (Article 1477, Civil Code). If Aida wanted to rescind the contract of sale to Lorna, she should have made a notarized or judicial demand for rescission of the same (Article 1592, Civil Code). Otherwise, the vendee still the right to effect payment even after expiration of the period agreed upon. Absent any demand for rescission of the contract of sale and due to the constructive delivery of the property to Lorna, there was no valid sale between Aida to Fe because the ownership of the property has already transferred to Lorna [Spouses Beltran v. Spouses Cangayda, G.R. No. 225033, August 15, 2018; Agustin v. De Vera, G.R. No. 233455, April 3, 2019].
X
Laica and Jessica, who are best friends, are both engaged in money lending at predatory interest rates. Running out of funds, Laica borrows Php 2,000,000.00 from Jessica for two months at a monthly interest rate of 10%. Jessica releases the borrowed amount after Laica signs a promissory note. Laica then relends to Monica the borrowed amount of Php 2,000,000.00 for two months, at an interest rate of 30%. After two months, Laica fails to pay Jessica, prompting Jessica to file a collection suit against the former, for the Php 2,000,000.00 principal and 10% interest per month pursuant to their agreement. Laica counters that the monthly interest rate of 10% is exorbitant and should be reduced to the legal rate of interest at 6% per annum,
Which between the positions of Laica and Jessica is tenable? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The position of Laica is tenable compared to that of Jessica because the rate imposed is unconscionable and excessive. The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is void for being contrary to morals and the law. Given that the agreement on the 10% monthly interest is void for being unconscionable, the legal rate of interest for loans or forbearances of money, which is 6% per annum, will be the substitute rate. Since the interest rate imposed is void, the non- payment of the principal loan obligation does not place the debtor in a state of default. This is because under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if a debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. Necessarily, since the obligation of making interest payments in the instant case is illegal and thus non-demandable, the payment of the principal loan obligation was likewise not yet demandable on the part of the creditor. In the given problem, therefore, the action for collection is premature because the debtor is not yet in default [Bulatao v. Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019].
XI.
Leon is the owner of a condominium unit located directly above the condominium unit owned by Anj. In 2014, Léon undertook renovations in his unit’s bathroom, which caused water to leak from his bathroom down to Anj’s unit, and caused extensive damage to Anj’s belongings. As Anj had obtained property insurance on her unit and its contents from Proverbial Insurance Co. (PIC), Anj was able to recover the value of the damage in September 2016.
In October 2022, PIC, as subrogee of Anj, sued Leon to recover the insurance proceeds it paid to Anj. Leon interposed prescription to dismiss the suit of PIC. PIC counters that the payment of the insurance proceeds in 2016 created, by way of legal subrogation, a 10-year period within which to file the suit against Leon.
Is PIC correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, PIC is not correct because the action was filed beyond the 4-year prescriptive period allowed for causes of action based on quasi-delict. The cause of action of Anj against Leon is based on quasi-delict, which has a prescriptive period of 4 years from the accrual of cause of action. The cause of action of Anj occurred in 2014. Hence, she has until 2018 within which to file the action. Considering that PIC is merely subrogated to the rights of Anj, it inherits only the remaining period within which the insured may file the action against the wrongdoer. Here, the action was filed by PIC only in 2022, or after the lapse of the 4-year prescriptive period. Hence, the action had already prescribed [Henson, Jr. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 223134, August 14, 2019, abandoning Vector Shipping Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company, G.R. No. 159213, July 3, 2013].
Alternative Answer:
Yes, PIC is correct because the action was filed within the 10-year prescriptive period allowed for causes of action based on written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code. In this case, PIC’s cause of action to recover proceeds it paid to Anj accrued in 2016 when PIC became the subrogee of Anj based on the insurance contract. Thus, PIC’s action to recover based on the insurance contract was not yet prescribed when it sued in October 2022.
XII
Gio, single, joined a marathon organized by Takbo Co. For lack of alternative routes, the marathon course included a public road which was not blocked-off from vehicles. Takbo Co. solicited the sponsorship of Kotse Corp. for added financial support. Gio was hit by a jeepney driven by JD on the public road and died. The parents of Gio sued Takbo Co. and Kotse Corp. for damages. The court ruled that Kotse Corp. is solidarily liable for damages with Takbo Co. for being one of the principal movers of the event due to its sponsorship.
Is the court correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the court is not correct in holding Kotse Corp. solidarily liable for damages with Takbo Co. because its mere sponsorship of the marathon was too remote to be the efficient and proximate cause of the death of Gio. Based on the facts, the sponsorship of the marathon by Kotse Corp. was limited to financing the race and it was not involved at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. Hence, Kotse Corp. took no part in the determination of the route for the race and the adoption of the action plan, including the safety and security measures for the benefit of the runners. In fine, there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship of Kotse Corp. and the death of Gio [Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017].
XIII
Eka, a Filipina, and Du-guil, a Korean, married in the Philippines. Thereafter, they moved to Seoul, South Korea. While there, Du- guil began to ignore Eka. He was always out with his friends and usually came home drunk. When Eka could not take their marital situation anymore, she asked for a divorce. Du-guil agreed on the condition that Eka would be the one to file for divorce, and that the ground should be “no fault,” meaning, neither of them is at fault or neither would be accused of any wrongdoing. After the divorce, Eka went back to the Philippines and filed a case to have the judgment of divorce recognized. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Eka’s petition because she alone filed for divorce, in violation of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. According to the RTC, Article 26 requires that either the foreign spouse alone initiates the filing of the divorce or, at the very least, Eka and Du-guil should have filed for divorce jointly.
Is the RTC correct? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Family Code is applicable regardless of who may have obtained the decree of divorce abroad. If the decree of divorce obtained abroad has the effect of releasing the foreigner spouse from the marriage, then the Filipino spouse is also released from the marriage applying Article 26, may have obtained the decree of divorce. Thus, pursuant to the ruling in Manalo, Article 26, paragraph 2, applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; or (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse [Galapon v. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020].
XIV
During Remy’s pregnancy, her father Gavin executed a will bequeathing his rest house in Calatagan, Batangas to Remy’s unborn child. While Gavin and Remy, who was then seven months pregnant, were on their way to Calatagan, they figured in a car accident on December 1, 2021 which resulted in the instantaneous death of Gavin and the premature delivery of Remy on the same day. At 8:30 a.m. on December 3, 2021, the newborn baby died.
Is the devise in favor of the baby valid? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the devise is valid because the devisee had the requisite capacity to succeed. According to Article 40 of the Civil Code, a child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in Article 41 of the Civil Code. The latter provision, in turn, provides that if the fetus has an intra-uterine life of at least seven months, it is considered born for all civil purposes if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. In the given problem, the baby had an intra-uterine life of at least seven months and was alive at the time of complete delivery on December 1, 2021 because it died only on December 3, 2021. Consequently, the baby inherited the rest house in Calatagan, Batangas.
XV
[This item has two questions.]
Miguel, who died single and childless, was survived by his two legitimate brothers Romy and Rolly, and his nephews Arno and Pabs, the legitimate sons of his predeceased legitimate brother Edgar. Before his death, Miguel executed a one-page notarial will, inclusive of an attestation clause and a notarial acknowledgment, with only one testamentary disposition bequeathing his entire estate to Romy and Rolly. The will was not paginated and was attested by four witnesses: Uno, Dos, Tres, and Quatro. It was the eve of Quatro’s 17th birthday when the will was executed. The will was written in the Ilocano dialect which Miguel knew and understood, but the witnesses did not. Miguel and the witnesses signed at the end of the testamentary disposition. The attestation was also written in the Ilocano dialect which, when translated to the English language, reads as follows:
“This will of Miguel was written in ONE page. We, the attesting witnesses, signed at the end of the will and at the bottom of this attestation in the presence of Miguel and of each of us.”
Each of the four witnesses signed below the attestation clause. Because none of the witnesses knew and understood the Ilocano dialect, the attestation was interpreted to them by Miguel’s lawyer
who was present to notarize the will.
(a) Does the fact that the will was written in a dialect known only to Miguel invalidate the will? What about the absence of the marginal signatures of the testator and the witnesses? Explain
briefly.
(b) May the will nonetheless be admitted to probate? Explain briefly. (5 points)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
A
(a) No, the fact that the will is written in a dialect known only to the testator but not known to the witnesses does not render the will invalid because the law only requires that the will be written in a language or dialect known to the testator. (Article 804, Civil Code) There is no requirement that the language or dialect in which the will is written be also known to the witnesses. In addition, the absence of marginal signatures does not likewise render the will invalid. Since the will consists of only one page, the testator is mandatorily required to affix his signature only at the end of the will, which requirement is satisfied in this case. The absence of marginal signatures on the part of the witnesses did not also invalidate the will because they nonetheless signed the attestation clause. Their signatures at the bottom of the attestation clause will also satisfy the requirement of subscription, which is what the marginal signatures on the part of the witness represent. With respect to such a requirement, the location of the signatures of the witnesses is not important. (Article 805 (1) and (2), Civil Code)
(b) No, the will may not be admitted to probate because it failed to comply with the formalities required by law in the execution of wills. The will is void because the attestation clause failed to state that the testator Miguel also signed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses. (Article 805(3), Civil Code) Such omission is fatal because the attestation clause is the only proof of compliance with such requirement. Considering that the proof of compliance with such requirement is not seen in the one-page instrument, the will becomes invalid because resort to extrinsic evidence is not allowed to prove compliance with such requirement.
END OF PART 1