Constitutional Law, Taxation

PETRON vs. TIANGCO G.R. No. 158881 April 16, 2008 Taxation, LGC

FACTS:

Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex, and through that depot, it has engaged in the selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay.

Petron received a letter from the office of Navotas Mayor, respondent Toby Tiangco, wherein the corporation was assessed taxes relative to the figures covering sale of diesel, stating the total amount due of P6,259,087.62, a figure derived from the gross sales of the depot from 1997 to 2001. The computation sheets that were attached to the letter made reference to Ordinance 92-03, or the New Navotas Revenue Code (Navotas Revenue Code), though such enactment was not cited in the letter itself.

Petron filed with the Malabon RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing Petron’s complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed amount.

Petron has opted to assail the RTC Decision directly before this Court since the matter at hand involves pure questions of law, a characterization conceded by the RTC Decision itself. Particularly, the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of Section 133(h) of the LGC, and the applicability of Article 232 (h) of the IRR.

Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and Barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

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(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;

 

ISSUE:

Whether a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum products.

 

RULING:

Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local government units to exercise their taxing powers otherwise granted to them under the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units, namely: excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.

The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in Section 143 of the LGC. Under the provision, a municipality is authorized to impose business taxes on a whole host of business activities. Suffice it to say, unless there is another provision of law which states otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product for that matter.

As earlier observed, Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units: excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. There is no doubt that among the excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC are those levied on petroleum products, per Section 148 of the NIRC.

The power of a municipality to impose business taxes derives from Section 143 of the Code that specifically enumerates several types of business on which it may impose taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; retailers;  contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce. This obviously broad power is further supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section 143 which authorizes the sanggunian to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax.

 

This ability of local government units to impose business or other local taxes is ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article X assures that [e]ach local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges, though the power is subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. There is no doubt that following the 1987 Constitution and the Code, the fiscal autonomy of local government units has received greater affirmation than ever. Previous decisions that have been skeptical of the viability, if not the wisdom of reposing fiscal autonomy to local government units have fallen by the wayside.

Respondents cite our declaration in City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes that following the 1987 Constitution the rule thenceforth in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. Such policy is also echoed in Section 5(a) of the Code, which states that any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b) then proceeds to assert that [i]n case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. And this latter qualification has to be respected as a constitutionally authorized limitation which Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently, local fiscal autonomy should not necessarily translate into abject deference to the power of local government units to impose taxes.

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